The Strategic Use of Scandals

19 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2020

See all articles by Gilles Grolleau

Gilles Grolleau

Montpellier SupAgro and Researcher at LAMETA

Alain Marciano

Université de Montpellier; Université Montpellier I - Montpellier Recherche en Economie (Montpellier Research in Economics) MRE

Naoufel Mzoughi

INRA Ecodéveloppement

Date Written: November 2020

Abstract

Scandals are pervasive in many areas of society. We propose a characterization of scandals that explicitly considers their potential benefits to transgressors. Although scandals are frequently considered to be undesirable to the targets or transgressors implicated, we develop four rationales by which a scandal can actually be beneficial to them. First, a scandal can propel an individual, organization or cause into the limelight and generate low‐cost publicity that can serve the target’s interest, e.g., by increasing the visibility and salience of a particular issue or providing them a platform to spin the scandal with the megaphone of mass media coverage. Second, a scandal target can choose to play the role of altruistic or self‐seeking scapegoat. Third, a scandal target can use a scandal as a smokescreen to divert attention from other more serious issues. Fourth, a scandal can serve as a way to disadvantage competitors or rivals. For each rationale, we suggest some conditions of its success. Anecdotal evidence and real‐world examples are also provided to illustrate and support these rationales.

Suggested Citation

Grolleau, Gilles and Marciano, Alain and Mzoughi, Naoufel, The Strategic Use of Scandals (November 2020). Kyklos, Vol. 73, Issue 4, pp. 524-542, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3705439 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12249

Gilles Grolleau (Contact Author)

Montpellier SupAgro and Researcher at LAMETA ( email )

France

Alain Marciano

Université de Montpellier ( email )

Avenue Raymond Dugrand, CS 79606
Montpellier Cedex 1, F-34000
France

Université Montpellier I - Montpellier Recherche en Economie (Montpellier Research in Economics) MRE ( email )

Montpellier
France

Naoufel Mzoughi

INRA Ecodéveloppement ( email )

Domaine Saint-Paul - Site Agroparc
Avignon cedex 9, 84914
France

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