Algorithmic Disclosure Rules

Abstract

During the past decade, a small but rapidly growing number of Law&Tech scholars have been applying algorithmic methods in their legal research. This Article does it too, for the sake of saving disclosure regulation failure: a normative strategy that has long been considered dead by legal scholars, but conspicuously abused by rule-makers.
Existing proposals to revive disclosure duties, however, either focus on the industry policies (e.g. seeking to reduce consumers' costs of reading) or on rulemaking (e.g. by simplifying linguistic intricacies). But failure may well depend on both. Therefore, this Article develops a `comprehensive approach', suggesting to use computational tools to cope with linguistic and behavioral failures at both the enactment and implementation phases of disclosure duties, thus filling a void in the Law&Tech scholarship. Specifically, it outlines how algorithmic tools can be used in a holistic manner to address the many failures of disclosures from the rulemaking in parliament to consumer screens.
It suggests a multi-layered design where lawmakers deploy three tools in order to produce optimal disclosure rules: machine learning (ML), natural language processing (NLP), and behavioral experimentation through regulatory sandboxes. To clarify how and why these tasks should be performed, disclosures in the contexts of online contract terms and privacy online are taken as examples.
Because algorithmic rulemaking is frequently met with well-justified skepticism, problems of its compatibility with legitimacy, efficacy and proportionality are also discussed.

Keywords: Disclosure Regulation, Regulatory Failure, Consumers, Law And Technology, Information Duties, Machine learning, Algorithms, Natural Language Processing, Regulatory Sandboxes, Knowledge Graph, Due Process, Self-Implementation I

JEL Classification: K10, K20