The Pricing Puzzle: The Default Term Structure of Collateralised Loan Obligations

96 Pages Posted: 7 Apr 2003

Date Written: December 2002

Abstract

Ambivalence in the regulatory definition of capital adequacy for credit risk has recently stirred the financial services industry to collateral loan obligations (CLOs) as an important balance sheet management tool. CLOs represent a specialised form of Asset-Backed Securitisation (ABS), with investors acquiring a structured claim on the interest proceeds generated from a portfolio of bank loans in the form of tranches with different seniority. By way of modelling Merton-type risk-neutral asset returns of contingent claims on a multi-asset portfolio of corporate loans in a CLO transaction, we analyse the optimal design of loan securitisation from the perspective of credit risk in potential collateral default. We propose a pricing model that draws on a careful simulation of expected loan loss based on parametric bootstrapping through extreme value theory (EVT). The analysis illustrates the dichotomous effect of loss cascading, as the most junior tranche of CLO transactions exhibits a distinctly different default tolerance compared to the remaining tranches. By solving the puzzling question of properly pricing the risk premium for expected credit loss, we explain the rationale of first loss retention as credit risk cover on the basis of our simulation results for pricing purposes under the impact of asymmetric information.

Keywords: Loan securitisation, CLO, structured finance

JEL Classification: C15, C22, D82, F34, G13, G18, G20

Suggested Citation

Jobst, Andreas A., The Pricing Puzzle: The Default Term Structure of Collateralised Loan Obligations (December 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=370641 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.370641

Andreas A. Jobst (Contact Author)

Central Bank of the UAE ( email )

Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates
+971-543439374 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.linkedin.com/in/andyjobst/

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
990
Abstract Views
4,456
Rank
49,950
PlumX Metrics