The Limits and Consequences of Population Policy: Evidence from China's Wan Xi Shao Campaign

61 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2020

See all articles by Kimberly Singer Babiarz

Kimberly Singer Babiarz

Stanford University

Paul Ma

University of Minnesota

Grant Miller

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Stanford University - School of Medicine

Shige Song

City University of New York (CUNY)

Date Written: October 11, 2020

Abstract

Prior to the famous One Child Policy, China's total fertility rate declined by more than 50% during the 1970s - one of the most rapid sustained fertility declines documented in modern history. Coinciding with this transition was China's first national population policy, Wan Xi Shao, also known as the Longer, Later Fewer (LLF) campaign. Studying LLF's contribution to fertility and fertility strategies favoring sons, we find that the campaign i) reduced China's total fertility rate by 0.88 births per woman (explaining 27% of China's modern fertility decline), ii) doubled the use of male-biased fertility stopping rules, and iii) promoted postnatal selection (implying 200,000 previously unrecognized missing girls). Considering Chinese population policy to be extreme in global experience, our paper demonstrates the limits of population policy in explaining demographic transitions — and its potential human costs.

Keywords: demographic transition, fertility, sex selection, postnatal selection

JEL Classification: I15, J13, J16

Suggested Citation

Singer Babiarz, Kimberly and Ma, Paul and Miller, Grant and Miller, Grant and Song, Shige, The Limits and Consequences of Population Policy: Evidence from China's Wan Xi Shao Campaign (October 11, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3709206 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3709206

Kimberly Singer Babiarz

Stanford University ( email )

No Address Available

Paul Ma (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota ( email )

19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.paulma.org

Grant Miller

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Stanford University - School of Medicine ( email )

291 Campus Drive
Li Ka Shing Building
Stanford, CA 94305-5101
United States

Shige Song

City University of New York (CUNY) ( email )

695 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10021
United States

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