When Permissioned Blockchains Deliver More Decentralization Than Permissionless

Communications of the ACM

7 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2021

See all articles by Yannis Bakos

Yannis Bakos

New York University (NYU) - Department of Information, Operations, and Management Sciences

Hanna Halaburda

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Christoph Mueller-Bloch

ESSEC Business School - Information & Decision Sciences Department

Date Written: September 25, 2019

Abstract

Permissionless blockchain systems inspired by Bitcoin and related crypto-ecosystems are frequently promoted as the enablers of an open, distributed, and decentralized ideal. They are hailed as a solution that can “democratize” the world by creating a technological imperative favoring open, distributed, and decentralized systems, platforms, and markets. We argue that such claims and expectations, while they may be fulfilled under certain circumstances, are generally exaggerated and often misguided. They illustrate a penchant to associate open access with decentralized control in distributed architectures, an association that while possible is far from guaranteed. When enterprise, social and economic activities are “put on the blockchain” in order to avoid centralized control, permissioned governance may offer a more decentralized and more predictable outcome than open permissionless governance offers in practice..

Keywords: blockchain, governance, decentralization, open-access, permissioned, permissionless

JEL Classification: O3

Suggested Citation

Bakos, Yannis and Halaburda, Hanna and Mueller-Bloch, Christoph, When Permissioned Blockchains Deliver More Decentralization Than Permissionless (September 25, 2019). Communications of the ACM, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3715596 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3715596

Yannis Bakos

New York University (NYU) - Department of Information, Operations, and Management Sciences ( email )

44 West Fourth Street
New York, NY 10012
United States
212-998-0841 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~bakos

Hanna Halaburda (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

Christoph Mueller-Bloch

ESSEC Business School - Information & Decision Sciences Department ( email )

Avenue Bernard Hirsch B.P. 50105
Cergy-Pontoise (Paris), 95021
France

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