Energy Trading and Its Multiplicity of Supervisors: Effectiveness of Fragmented Supervision and Information Sharing in View of Reporting Obligations for Energy Trading Companies

TARN Working Paper Series 04/2020, July 2020

30 Pages Posted: 9 Nov 2020

Date Written: July 31, 2020

Abstract

Energy companies trading in derivatives which have a value based on an energy product (“Energy Trading”) are subjected to a fragmented regulatory framework. They are supervised by a multitude of authorities on a national and European level. These authorities cooperate horizontally (between EU agencies or between national regulatory authorities) or vertically – between EU agencies and NRA’s) and in a formal and informal way. They share information on Energy Trading to detect market abuse. This article aims to provide insight in the effectiveness of supervisory activities within the Energy Trading landscape. In doing so, the obligation for energy companies to report fundamental data on the derivatives they trade in, is used for illustrative purposes and explained in light of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (‘EMIR’), the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation (‘MiFID II and MiFIR’) and the regulation on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (‘REMIT’). The article finishes with a conclusion which advocates the necessity of information sharing and professional secrecy in the current regulatory landscape and intends to contribute to a discussion on the effectiveness of information sharing within an international context.

Keywords: Energy Trading, Effective Supervision, Market Abuse, Reporting Obligations, Information Sharing, Professional Secrecy

Suggested Citation

Hiemstra, Liebrich, Energy Trading and Its Multiplicity of Supervisors: Effectiveness of Fragmented Supervision and Information Sharing in View of Reporting Obligations for Energy Trading Companies (July 31, 2020). TARN Working Paper Series 04/2020, July 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3715737 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3715737

Liebrich Hiemstra (Contact Author)

Tilburg University ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Netherlands

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