Modelling the Costs of Energy Regulation: Evidence of Human Resource Constraints in Developing Countries

London Business School, Regulation Initiative Working Paper No. 49

43 Pages Posted: 18 Jun 2003

See all articles by Jon Stern

Jon Stern

City, University of London - Centre for Competition and Regulatory Policy - Department of Economics

Preetum Domah

University of Cambridge - Judge Business School

Michael G. Pollitt

University of Cambridge - Judge Business School

Date Written: October 2002

Abstract

Successful electricity industry reform depends on the presence of an appropriately staffed regulatory agency for the liberalised sector. However developing countries can have resource contraints that make the establishment of an effective regulatory agency difficult. This paper attempts an econometric modelling of staff numbers in electricity regulatory institutions. We specfy a model of the determinants of staff numbers that reflects electricity systems complexity as well as national eceonomic and regulatory environments. We empirically estimate a translog cost function specfication of the model using data on 60 electricity regulators collected from an international questionnaire survey in 2000-01. We conclude that there are significant differences between the regulatory cost functions of developed and developing countries and that, in establishing independent regulatory agencies, developing countries face high fixed costs relative to market size.

Keywords: Electricty Regulation, International Comparisons, Human Resources

JEL Classification: L30, N40, O15

Suggested Citation

Stern, Jon and Domah, Preetum and Pollitt, Michael G., Modelling the Costs of Energy Regulation: Evidence of Human Resource Constraints in Developing Countries (October 2002). London Business School, Regulation Initiative Working Paper No. 49. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=371600 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.371600

Jon Stern (Contact Author)

City, University of London - Centre for Competition and Regulatory Policy - Department of Economics ( email )

Northampton Square
London, EC1V 0HB
United Kingdom

Preetum Domah

University of Cambridge - Judge Business School

Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom

Michael G. Pollitt

University of Cambridge - Judge Business School ( email )

Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom
+44 (0) 1223 339615 (Phone)
+44 (0) 1223 339701 (Fax)

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
224
Abstract Views
1,638
rank
146,345
PlumX Metrics