Strategic Timing of IPOs and Disclosure: A Dynamic Model of Multiple Firms

The Accounting Review, Vol. 96, No. 3, 2021

NYU Stern School of Business Research Paper Series

59 Pages Posted: 4 Dec 2020 Last revised: 15 Jul 2021

See all articles by Cyrus Aghamolla

Cyrus Aghamolla

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities

Ilan Guttman

Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University; New York University - Stern Scholl of business

Date Written: July 2, 2020

Abstract

We study a dynamic timing game between multiple firms, who decide when to go public in the presence of possible information externalities. A firm's IPO pricing is a function of its privately observed idiosyncratic type and the level of investor sentiment, which follows a stochastic, mean-reverting process. Firms may wish to delay their IPOs in order to observe the market reception of the offerings of their peers. We characterize the unique symmetric threshold equilibrium, whereby pioneer firms with high idiosyncratic types endogenously emerge. The results provide novel implications regarding variation in IPO timing, sequential clustering, IPO droughts, the composition of new issues over time, and how IPO volume fluctuates over time. These include, among others, that in more populated industries, a lower proportion of firms emerge as industry pioneers, but follower IPO volume is intensified. Additionally, heightened uncertainty over investor sentiment exacerbates delay and leads to lower IPO volume.

Keywords: Initial public offerings, information spillovers, investor sentiment, disclosure.

JEL Classification: C73, D83, G12, G14.

Suggested Citation

Aghamolla, Cyrus and Guttman, Ilan, Strategic Timing of IPOs and Disclosure: A Dynamic Model of Multiple Firms (July 2, 2020). The Accounting Review, Vol. 96, No. 3, 2021, NYU Stern School of Business Research Paper Series, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3717140 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3717140

Cyrus Aghamolla (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities ( email )

420 Delaware St. SE
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

Ilan Guttman

Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

New York University - Stern Scholl of business ( email )

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