Competition Law and Economics of Big Data: A New Competition Rulebook-Introduction

Abstract

This thesis addresses Big Data issues in competition law in three chapters. Chapter one proposes new economic tools to define the relevant market and the market power in the data-driven economy. It argues the need to reform the relevant market and the market power by considering new tools and a menu of key features relevant to the market power. Chapter two proposes new law and economics analysis for data-driven antitrust and merger practices. It considers debated topics related to the integration of privacy in the assessment of antitrust and merger practices, algorithmic collusion and pre-emptive mergers. It argues the need to integrate privacy in any data-driven antitrust and merger practices as data imply necessarily privacy and data protection issues. Finally, chapter three proposes to regulate the digital economy. It demonstrates that the economy is highly concentrated and that the markets cannot correct themselves market failures. It analyzes recommendations from the government reports (Furman et al, Crémer et al, Schallbruch et al, ACCC report, and Stigler report) and it proposes and discusses other original proposals.

Keywords: Big Data, data economics, digital economy, online platforms, competition law, competition economics, regulation, antitrust, merger, collusion, algorithmic collusion, GAFAM, economics of free, economics of privacy, data protection

JEL Classification: K21, L1, L4, L5, L86