Dynastic Control Without Ownership: Evidence from Post-War Japan
35 Pages Posted: 26 Oct 2020 Last revised: 30 Oct 2020
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Dynastic Control Without Ownership: Evidence from Post-War Japan
Dynastic Control Without Ownership: Evidence from Post-War Japan
Dynastic Control without Ownership: Evidence from Post‐war Japan
Date Written: October 23, 2020
Abstract
Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than five percent). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such as Casio, Suzuki and Toyota, and are often grouped with widely-held firms in the literature. These firms differ in key performance measures from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and evolve from the former as equity-financed growth dilutes the founding family’s ownership over time. In turn, the transition from dynastic control to non-family status is driven by a diminution of strategic family resources.
Keywords: Family control, Ownership, Succession
JEL Classification: G32, L26
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation