Dynastic Control Without Ownership: Evidence from Post-War Japan

35 Pages Posted: 26 Oct 2020 Last revised: 30 Oct 2020

See all articles by Morten Bennedsen

Morten Bennedsen

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Vikas Mehrotra

University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis

Jungwook Shim

Independent

Yupana Wiwattanakantang

National University of Singapore - Department of Finance ; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 23, 2020

Abstract

Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than five percent). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such as Casio, Suzuki and Toyota, and are often grouped with widely-held firms in the literature. These firms differ in key performance measures from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and evolve from the former as equity-financed growth dilutes the founding family’s ownership over time. In turn, the transition from dynastic control to non-family status is driven by a diminution of strategic family resources.

Keywords: Family control, Ownership, Succession

JEL Classification: G32, L26

Suggested Citation

Bennedsen, Morten and Mehrotra, Vikas and Shim, Jungwook and Wiwattanakantang, Yupana, Dynastic Control Without Ownership: Evidence from Post-War Japan (October 23, 2020). European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 705/2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3717621 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3717621

Morten Bennedsen (Contact Author)

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
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University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

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Vikas Mehrotra

University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis ( email )

School of Business
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada
780-492-2976 (Phone)
780-492-3325 (Fax)

Jungwook Shim

Independent ( email )

Yupana Wiwattanakantang

National University of Singapore - Department of Finance ( email )

Business School
Mochtar Riady Building #7-44, 15 Kent Ridge Dri
Singapore, 117592
Singapore
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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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1000 Brussels
Belgium

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