Measuring What Matters in Public Procurement Law: Efficiency, Quality and More

Journal of Management Policy and Practice, Vol. 21(3) 2020, pp. 73-98

Yale Law & Economics Research Paper

26 Pages Posted: 9 Nov 2020 Last revised: 8 Dec 2021

See all articles by Desiree Klingler

Desiree Klingler

University of St. Gallen; Yale Law School; University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics

Date Written: October 23, 2020

Abstract

Modern public procurement laws — such as the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation — are based on the principle of efficiency. Recent revisions have introduced the concepts of sustainability and anti-corruption. Decision makers are now confronted with new goals that ask for trade-offs. However, no structured method to assess their effects exists. This Article stresses the need for regulatory impact assessments to evaluate the economic consequences of public procurement regulation. It suggests two evaluation frameworks and defines parameters to measure the benefits of public procurement. Overall, the Article aims at informing the policy debate on better procurement regulation, suggesting a “more economic approach.”

Keywords: public procurement, efficiency, quality, law and economics, measuring, regulatory impact assessment, cost-benefit analysis

JEL Classification: D61, D63, H57, K23, L33

Suggested Citation

Klingler, Desiree, Measuring What Matters in Public Procurement Law: Efficiency, Quality and More (October 23, 2020). Journal of Management Policy and Practice, Vol. 21(3) 2020, pp. 73-98, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3718077

Desiree Klingler (Contact Author)

University of St. Gallen ( email )

Varnbuelstr. 14
Saint Gallen, St. Gallen CH-9000
Switzerland

Yale Law School ( email )

127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06510
United States

University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany

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