The Liquidity Sensitivity of Healthcare Consumption: Evidence from Social Security Payments

89 Pages Posted: 27 Oct 2020 Last revised: 13 Feb 2025

See all articles by Tal Gross

Tal Gross

Columbia University - Department of Health Policy and Management

Timothy J. Layton

Harvard Medical School - Department of Health Care Policy; National Bureau of Economic Research

Daniel Prinz

Harvard University

Date Written: October 2020

Abstract

Some consumers lack the cash needed to pay for medical care. As a result, they either delay care until they can pay for it or they forgo the care altogether. To test for such a possibility, we study the distribution of monthly Social Security checks among Medicare Part D enrollees. When Social Security checks are distributed, prescription fills increase by 6-12 percent. In that sense, drug consumption of low-income Medicare recipients is "liquidity sensitive." We then study recipients who transition onto a program that eliminates copayments. When those recipients do not face copayments, their drug consumption becomes less liquidity sensitive. That finding implies that, beyond risk protection, generous insurance also provides recipients with the ability to consume healthcare when they need it rather than when they have cash. Further, we find that recipients whose drug consumption is most liquidity sensitive exhibit price elasticities of demand that are twice the size of the average elasticity, suggesting that more-generous insurance causes recipients both to re-time prescription filling and also to start filling prescriptions that they otherwise would not fill. We present a stylized model that uses this finding to call into question the conventional interpretation of demand-response to price as solely inefficient moral hazard.

Suggested Citation

Gross, Tal and Layton, Timothy J. and Prinz, Daniel, The Liquidity Sensitivity of Healthcare Consumption: Evidence from Social Security Payments (October 2020). NBER Working Paper No. w27977, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3718889

Tal Gross (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Department of Health Policy and Management ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.talgross.com

Timothy J. Layton

Harvard Medical School - Department of Health Care Policy ( email )

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United States

National Bureau of Economic Research ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Daniel Prinz

Harvard University ( email )

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