Avoiding Wasteful Competition: Why Trading on Inside Information Should Be Illegal

63 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2020 Last revised: 24 Feb 2022

Date Written: February 1, 2022

Abstract

This article offers a new and compelling reason to make all trading based on inside information illegal.

The value realized by trading on inside information is unusual in two respects. First, inside information is produced at little or no incremental cost and is nevertheless quite valuable. Second, profits made from trading on inside information come largely at the expense of others. When the value of something exceeds the cost to produce it, a wasteful race to be the first to capture the resulting surplus is likely to ensue. Similarly, resources expended solely to take something of value from others are wasted from an overall social welfare perspective. Thus, both at its source and in its use inside information invites wasteful competition. A law prohibiting insider trading is the best way to avoid this wasteful competition.

Previous scholarship misses this obvious conclusion because of its reliance on one of three assumptions. First, wasteful competition is assumed to be a problem that markets can rectify. Second, private ordering solutions are assumed to be available even when market mechanisms fail to address this problem. Third, a wasteful race to acquire and use inside information is viewed as otherwise unavoidable. None of these assumptions is correct.

The findings here have immediate policy implications. First, insider trading legislation should be enacted that bans all insider trading and not just trading based on wrongfully acquired information. Second, there is no reason to require proof that a tipper received a personal benefit to prosecute someone for tipping inside information. Third, the possession and not the use of inside information should be enough to trigger a trading prohibition.

Suggested Citation

Guttentag, Michael D., Avoiding Wasteful Competition: Why Trading on Inside Information Should Be Illegal (February 1, 2022). Loyola Law School, Los Angeles Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-27, Brooklyn Law Review , Vol. 86, No. 3, 2021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3719546

Michael D. Guttentag (Contact Author)

Loyola Law School Los Angeles ( email )

919 Albany Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015-1211
United States

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