A Little Fairness May Induce a Lot of Redistribution in Democracy

U of St. Gallen, Economics Discussion Paper No. 2002-30

European Economic Review, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2006

38 Pages Posted: 25 Feb 2003 Last revised: 17 Oct 2008

See all articles by Jean-Robert Tyran

Jean-Robert Tyran

University of Vienna; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Rupert Sausgruber

Vienna University of Economics and Business - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 1, 2002

Abstract

We use a model of self-centered inequality aversion suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to study voting on redistribution. We theoretically identify two classes of conditions when an empirically plausible amount of fairness preferences induces redistribution through referenda. We test the predictions of the adapted inequality aversion model in a simple redistribution experiment, and find that it predicts voting outcomes far better than the standard model of voting assuming rationality and strict self-interest.

Keywords: Fairness, Voting, Redistribution

JEL Classification: D31, D63, D72

Suggested Citation

Tyran, Jean-Robert and Sausgruber, Rupert, A Little Fairness May Induce a Lot of Redistribution in Democracy (December 1, 2002). U of St. Gallen, Economics Discussion Paper No. 2002-30; European Economic Review, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=371984 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.371984

Jean-Robert Tyran (Contact Author)

University of Vienna ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, Vienna 1090
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/jean-robert.tyran/

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5
Bygning 26
1353 Copenhagen K.
Denmark
+45 353 23 027 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ku.dk/tyran/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Rupert Sausgruber

Vienna University of Economics and Business - Department of Economics ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1
Vienna, 1020
Austria
+43 1 31336 4572 (Phone)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
196
Abstract Views
1,481
rank
153,678
PlumX Metrics