ICO Analysts

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See all articles by Andreas Barth

Andreas Barth

Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Finance

Valerie Laturnus

Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Finance

Sasan Mansouri

Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Finance

Alexander F. Wagner

University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Swiss Finance Institute

Date Written: August 17, 2020

Abstract

Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) provide an opportunity to study the role of information frictions for financial markets in a setting with relatively little regulation. This paper analyzes the role of freelancing human experts (ICO analysts) as information intermediaries. ICO analyst assessments vary in quality and exhibit biases due to the reciprocal interactions of ICO analysts with ICO team members. Investors assign more weight to ratings by high-quality analysts, and they discount reciprocal ratings. Overall, the findings suggest that on this market, too, market discipline works to some extent and intermediaries can play an important role in mitigating information asymmetries.

Keywords: Analysts, Asymmetric Information, FinTech, Initial Coin Offering (ICO)

JEL Classification: G14, G24, L26, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Barth, Andreas and Laturnus, Valerie and Mansouri, Sasan and Wagner, Alexander F., ICO Analysts (August 17, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=

Andreas Barth (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Finance ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt, 60629
Germany

Valerie Laturnus

Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Finance ( email )

House of Finance
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, DE Hessen 60323
Germany

Sasan Mansouri

Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Finance ( email )

Gr├╝neburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany
+49(0)6979833727 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sasanm.de

Alexander F. Wagner

University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
Z├╝rich, 8032
Switzerland
+41 44 634 3963 (Phone)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Swiss Finance Institute ( email )

Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.alex-wagner.com

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