ICO Analysts

56 Pages Posted: 31 Dec 2020 Last revised: 27 May 2021

See all articles by Andreas Barth

Andreas Barth

Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Finance

Valerie Laturnus

Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Finance

Sasan Mansouri

Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Finance

Alexander F. Wagner

University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Swiss Finance Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 26, 2021

Abstract

Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) provide a clean opportunity and rich data to study the contribution of analysts to the functioning of capital markets. The assessments of freelancing ICO analysts vary in quality and exhibit biases due to the reciprocal interactions of analysts with ICO team members. Ratings predict ICO success, but imperfectly. Even favorably rated ICOs tend to fail when a greater portion of their ratings reciprocate prior ratings. Failure despite strong ratings is also frequent when analysts have a history of optimism, and when reviews strike a particularly positive tone. These findings suggest that information about the track record of analysts and their potentially conflicting activities is valuable to investors.

Keywords: Analysts, Asymmetric Information, FinTech, Initial Coin Offering (ICO)

JEL Classification: G14, G24, L26, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Barth, Andreas and Laturnus, Valerie and Mansouri, Sasan and Wagner, Alexander F., ICO Analysts (May 26, 2021). Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 21-26, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3720758 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3720758

Andreas Barth (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Finance ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt, 60629
Germany

Valerie Laturnus

Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Finance ( email )

House of Finance
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, DE Hessen 60323
Germany

Sasan Mansouri

Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Finance ( email )

Gr├╝neburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany
+49(0)6979833727 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sasanm.de

Alexander F. Wagner

University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
Z├╝rich, 8032
Switzerland
+41 44 634 3963 (Phone)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Swiss Finance Institute ( email )

Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.alex-wagner.com

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