Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design With Non-Quasilinear Preferences: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization for an Arbitrary Number of Objects

ISER DP No. 1107, 2020

17 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2021

See all articles by Ryosuke Sakai

Ryosuke Sakai

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research

Shigehiro Serizawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Date Written: October 25, 2020

Abstract

We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (2020B), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing rule among the rules satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.

Keywords: Multi-Object Allocation Problem, Strategy-Proofness, Ex-Post Revenue Maximization, Minimum Price Walrasian Rule, Non-Quasi-Linear Preference, Equal Treatment of Equals, Non-Wastefulness.

JEL Classification: D82, D47, D63.

Suggested Citation

Sakai, Ryosuke and Serizawa, Shigehiro, Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design With Non-Quasilinear Preferences: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization for an Arbitrary Number of Objects (October 25, 2020). ISER DP No. 1107, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3721845 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3721845

Ryosuke Sakai (Contact Author)

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research ( email )

6-1, Mihogaoka
Suita, Osaka 567-0047
Japan

Shigehiro Serizawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
+81 6 6879 8558 (Phone)
+81 6 6878 2766 (Fax)

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