Belief Inducibility and Informativeness

33 Pages Posted: 5 Jan 2021

See all articles by P. Jean-Jacques Herings

P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Tilburg University

Dominik Karos

Maastricht University

Toygar T. Kerman

Corvinus University of Budapest

Date Written: October 12, 2020

Abstract

We consider a group of receivers who share a common prior on a finite state space and who observe private correlated signals that are contingent on the true state of the world. We show that, while necessary, Bayes plausibility is not sufficient for a distribution over posterior belief vectors to be inducible, and we provide a characterization of inducible distributions. We classify communication strategies as minimal, direct, and language independent, and show that any inducible distribution can be induced by a language independent communication strategy (LICS). We investigate 12 the role of the different classes of communication strategies for the amount of higher order information that is revealed to receivers. We show that the least informative communication strategy which induces a fixed distribution over posterior belief vec tors lies in the relative interior of the set of all language independent communication strategies which induce that distribution.

Keywords: Information Design, Inducible Distributions, Informativeness

JEL Classification: D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques and Karos, Dominik and Kerman, Toygar T., Belief Inducibility and Informativeness (October 12, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3722145 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3722145

P. Jean-Jacques Herings (Contact Author)

Tilburg University ( email )

Department of Econometrics and Operations Research
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 4668797 (Phone)
5000 LE (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/jean-jacques-herings/home

Dominik Karos

Maastricht University ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, Limburg 6200MD
Netherlands

Toygar T. Kerman

Corvinus University of Budapest ( email )

Budapest
Hungary

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