Tiered Intermediation in Equity-holding Networks

65 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2021 Last revised: 18 Jan 2025

See all articles by Yu Shi

Yu Shi

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Robert M. Townsend

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Wu Zhu

Tsinghua University - School of Economics & Management

Date Written: October 30, 2020

Abstract

Using Chinese business registry data, we construct a comprehensive firm-to-firm equity-
holding network and demonstrate its role as a tiered financial intermediary. The network ex-
clusively channels credit supply shocks from corporate shareholders to their subsidiaries, with
no significant propagation between subsidiaries or in the reverse direction. We find that a
10% increase in local bank credit growth at corporate shareholders’ locations increases sub-
sidiary investment by 0.6% of tangible fixed asset value, accounting for 42.5% of the median
investment rate. This tiered intermediation is particularly pronounced when shareholders are
non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs) or controlling shareholders, and when subsidiaries
face greater financial constraints, less access to external financing, or exhibit high investment
opportunities. Equity transfers emerge as a key transmission channel, supported by robust
empirical evidence. Furthermore, to shed broader insights, we develop a general equilibrium
model incorporating an equity network, heterogeneous investment opportunities, and financial
constraints, showing that tiered intermediation arises as an equilibrium outcome.

Keywords: Tiered Intermediation, Business Groups, Equity Investment, Investment, Bank Credit Shock

JEL Classification: G23, G32

Suggested Citation

Shi, Yu and Townsend, Robert M. and Zhu, Wu, Tiered Intermediation in Equity-holding Networks (October 30, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3722173 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3722173

Yu Shi

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Robert M. Townsend

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

Wu Zhu (Contact Author)

Tsinghua University - School of Economics & Management ( email )

Beijing, 100084
China

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