Allocating Macro-Prudential Powers

20 Pages Posted: 5 Nov 2020

See all articles by Daniel Gros

Daniel Gros

Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Sam Langfield

European Central Bank

Marco Pagano

University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics; Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF); Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF); Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Dirk Schoenmaker

Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University; Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: October, 2014

Abstract

Monetary, macro-prudential and micro-prudential policies are intimately linked. The macroprudential authority should be allocated to the body where the overall balance of synergies (between policy objectives) over conflicts and the required expertise are the largest. This report reviews the pros and cons of the four institutional models for the allocation of macro-prudential powers: (1) the government, (2) the central bank, (3) the financial authority and (4) a committee with representatives from these three bodies.

Keywords: macroprudential regulation, economic policy, governance

JEL Classification: G28

Suggested Citation

Gros, Daniel and Langfield, Sam and Pagano, Marco and Schoenmaker, Dirk, Allocating Macro-Prudential Powers (October, 2014). ESRB: Advisory Scientific Committee Reports 2014/5, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3723326

Daniel Gros (Contact Author)

Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels ( email )

1 Place du Congres
B-1000 Brussels, 1000
Belgium

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Sam Langfield

European Central Bank ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

Marco Pagano

University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Via Cintia - Monte S. Angelo
Napoli, 80126
Italy
+39 081 675306 (Phone)
+39 081 7663540 (Fax)

Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )

Via Cintia
Complesso Monte S. Angelo
Naples, Naples 80126
Italy

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Via Sallustiana, 62
Rome, 00187
Italy

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org

Dirk Schoenmaker

Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Room T08-21
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.rsm.nl/people/dirk-schoenmaker/

Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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