How Should Tax Progressivity Respond to Rising Income Inequality

48 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2020

See all articles by Jonathan Heathcote

Jonathan Heathcote

Minneapolis Fed

Kjetil Storesletten

University of Oslo - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Gianluca Violante

Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Copenhagen; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: October 2020

Abstract

We address this question in a heterogeneous-agent incomplete-markets model featuring exogenous idiosyncratic risk, endogenous skill investment, and flexible labor supply. The tax and transfer schedule is restricted to be log-linear in income, a good description of the US system. Rising inequality is modeled as a combination of skill-biased technical change and growth in residual wage dispersion. When facing shifts in the income distribution like those observed in the US, a utilitarian planner chooses higher progressivity in response to larger residual inequality but lower progressivity in response to widening skill price dispersion reflecting technical change. Overall, optimal progressivity is approximately unchanged between 1980 and 2016. We document that the progressivity of the actual US tax and transfer system has similarly changed little since 1980, in line with the model prescription.

Keywords: inequality, InequalityMarkets, Labor Supply, optimal taxation, redistribution, Tax progressivity

JEL Classification: D30, E20, H20, I22, J22, J24

Suggested Citation

Heathcote, Jonathan and Storesletten, Kjetil and Violante, Gianluca, How Should Tax Progressivity Respond to Rising Income Inequality (October 2020). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15394, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3723586

Jonathan Heathcote (Contact Author)

Minneapolis Fed ( email )

90 Hennepin Avenue
Minneapolis, MN 55480
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.jonathanheathcote.com

Kjetil Storesletten

University of Oslo - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1095 Blindern
N-0317 Oslo
Norway
+47 2284 4009 (Phone)
+47 2285 5035 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://folk.uio.no/kjstore/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Gianluca Violante

Princeton University ( email )

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

University of Copenhagen

Nørregade 10
Copenhagen, København DK-1165
Denmark

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

7 Ridgmount Street
London, WC1E 7AE
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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