Efficiency Wages and Effort: Are Hard Jobs Better?

Strobl, Eric; Walsh, Frank

doi:10.2139/ssrn.372467

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Efficiency Wages and Effort: Are Hard Jobs Better?

8 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2003

See all articles by Eric Strobl

Eric Strobl

École Polytechnique, Paris - Department of Economic Sciences; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Frank Walsh

National University of Ireland - University College Dublin

Date Written: December 2002

Abstract

Efficiency wage theory predicts that the wage per unit of effort will be lower in intensively monitored sectors. This wage differential will increase in effort. Using employer-employee matched data from Ghana we provide evidence supporting this hypothesis.

Keywords: Efficiency Wages, Monitoring

JEL Classification: J41

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Strobl, Eric and Walsh, Frank, Efficiency Wages and Effort: Are Hard Jobs Better? (December 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=372467 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.372467