Anticipating Bailouts: the Incentive-Conflict Model and the Collapse of the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund
24 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2003 Last revised: 18 Nov 2007
Date Written: June 1994
The collapse of the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund in March 1985 provides a laboratory for examining the financial market's belief in the incentive-conflict model proposed by Kane (1989). Research in this area has yet to examine the stock returns of federally insured institutions during that period in the context of this model. Thus, it has not addressed the question of whether financial market participants recognize the implications of the model; that is, whether they anticipate the bailouts it implies. This paper fills that void. We find that on average, stocks of firms insured by the poorly capitalized FSLIC do reasonably well during the 41-day event window centered on the ODGF's Bank Holiday, while stocks of firms insured by the relatively well-capitalized FDIC do not. More important, differences in abnormal returns of FDIC and FSLIC firms are consistent with a reaffirmation of the incentive-conflict model.
Keywords: banking, forbearance, ODGF, incentive-conflict
JEL Classification: G21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation