Recent Studies on Common Ownership, Firm Behavior, and Market Outcomes

Abstract

The literature on competitive effects of common ownership has grown at a fast rate in the past two years. Anticompetitive effects have been confirmed with alternative reduced-form and structural estimation methods, in different industries, geographies and jurisdictions. Multiple independent studies have disproven early critiques of the literature. Other papers document the heterogeneity of common ownership effects on competition across markets and industries. Important advances were made on the study of the economic mechanisms and governance channels that implement anticompetitive incentives. New theory refines the interpretation of existing work. Access to high-quality ownership and product-market data remains a bottleneck for high-quality research in the area.

Keywords: ownership, control, industry concentration, antitrust, competition, managerial incentives, corporate governance

JEL Classification: D21, D22, G10, G30, G32, G34, J41, K21, L10, L16, L21, L40, L41, L42