The Complementarity Effect in the Venture Capital Contract: A Generalized Formulation and New Insights
Qiu, Menghui. "The complementarity effect in the venture capital contract: a generalised formulation and new insights." International Journal of Inventory Research, 2021, 6(1): 67-78.
Posted: 12 Jan 2021 Last revised: 8 Apr 2021
Date Written: March 12, 2021
The moral hazard problem plagues the start-ups and even mature enterprises when they incorporate venture capital to pursue business upgrade or expansion. Especially in the value chain where the venture capitalist can synergize with the entrepreneur to contribute to the firm value. This paper proposes a game theoretic approach to solve the entrepreneur's optimization problem in a venture capital financing scheme and generalizes the formulation without a specific revenue function. Furthermore, this study generates managerial insights for venture capital market and relevant sustainable supply chain management. The key results also show that the complementarity effect can incentivize both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist to exert more effort, thus achieving larger enterprise value when it is relatively significant, and the inefficiency caused by the allocation of equity share could be mitigated.
Keywords: equity share; venture capital; sequential decisions; game theory; supply chain management
JEL Classification: G24, G32
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