How Would Medicare for All Affect Health System Capacity? Evidence from Medicare for Some

68 Pages Posted: 9 Nov 2020

See all articles by Jeffrey P. Clemens

Jeffrey P. Clemens

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Economics; NBER

Joshua D. Gottlieb

University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jeffrey Hicks

University of British Columbia

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 9, 2020

Abstract

Proposals to create a national health care plan such as “Medicare for All” rely heavily on reducing the prices that insurers pay for health care. These changes affect physicians’ short-run incentives for care provision and may also change health care providers’ incentives to invest in capacity, thereby influencing the availability of care in the long term. We provide evidence on these responses using a major Medicare payment change combined with survey data on physicians’ time use. We find evidence that physicians increase their time spent on capacity building when remuneration increases, and that they are subsequently more willing to accept new patients – especially those who may be the residual claimants on marginal capacity. These forces imply that short-run supply curves likely differ from long-run supply curves. Policymakers need to account for how major changes to payment incentives would influence the investments that determine health system capacity.

JEL Classification: H51,I11,I13

Suggested Citation

Clemens, Jeffrey P. and Gottlieb, Joshua D. and Hicks, Jeffrey, How Would Medicare for All Affect Health System Capacity? Evidence from Medicare for Some (November 9, 2020). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2020-159, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3727520 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3727520

Jeffrey P. Clemens

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Economics ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0508
United States

HOME PAGE: http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~j1clemens/

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Joshua D. Gottlieb (Contact Author)

University of Chicago ( email )

1307 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.gottlieb.ca/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://papers.nber.org/authors/joshua_gottlieb

Jeffrey Hicks

University of British Columbia ( email )

997-1873 East Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1
Canada

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
52
Abstract Views
295
rank
434,701
PlumX Metrics