Neo-Liberal, State-Capitalist and Ordo-Liberal Conceptions of Multilevel Trade Regulation

34 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2020

See all articles by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann

Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW)

Armin Steinbach

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; Oxford University - Nuffield College; German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs

Date Written: November 1, 2020

Abstract

Reforms of international trade and investment law and institutions are hampered by conflicting economic paradigms. For instance, utilitarian Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism (e.g. promoting self-regulatory market forces privileging the homo economicus), constitutional European ordo-liberalism (e.g. protecting multilevel, constitutional rights and judicial remedies of EU citizens), and authoritarian state-capitalism (e.g. protecting totalitarian power monopolies of the communist party in China) pursue different legal and institutional designs of trade and investment agreements. Globalization and its transformation of national into transnational public goods (PGs) require extending constitutional and institutional economics to multilevel governance of transnational PGs in order to enhance the wealth of nations. Maintaining the worldwide legal and dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) - and interpreting its regional and national exception clauses broadly in order to reconcile diverse, national and regional institutions of economic integration and of ‘embedded liberalism’ - remains in the interest of all WTO member states.

Keywords: Adjudication; climate litigation; constitutionalism; neo-liberalism; ordo-liberalism; public goods; state-capitalism; WTO

Suggested Citation

Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich and Steinbach, Armin, Neo-Liberal, State-Capitalist and Ordo-Liberal Conceptions of Multilevel Trade Regulation (November 1, 2020). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2020/74, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3727871 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3727871

Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (Contact Author)

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW) ( email )

Via Bolognese 156 (Villa Salviati)
50-139 Firenze
Italy

Armin Steinbach

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt Schumacher Str 10
Bonn, 53113
Germany

Oxford University - Nuffield College ( email )

New Road
Oxford, OX1 1NF
United Kingdom

German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs ( email )

Scharnhorststrasse 34-37
Berlin, 10115
Germany

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