Some Reactions to “Reactionary Antitrust”

Published in Concurrences Competition Law Review, Nov. 2020

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 20-32

11 Pages Posted: 13 Nov 2020

See all articles by Seth B. Sacher

Seth B. Sacher

Independent

John M. Yun

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: November 12, 2020

Abstract

In a recent article, Professor John Newman describes and offers a defense of neo-antitrust, and critiques the position taken by those defending modern antitrust. Professor Newman distinguishes between what he sees as merely “conservative” responses—those opposed to the neo-antitrust policy positions, but not opposed to debating the issues they raise—and certain ideas that are “lightly derogatory” and exhibit “logical fallacies.” He proposes the provocative moniker “reactionary antitrust” to designate ideas that fall under this latter rubric.

In this article, we respond to Professor Newman’s critiques of the arguments made by critics of neo-antitrust. Broadly, his claim is that the critics are committing a number of logical fallacies; setting up and knocking down straw men; mistakenly calling their own position in the antitrust debate “apolitical”; and ignoring certain key arguments.

Keywords: neo-antitrust, Hipster Antitrust, New Brandeisians, Chicago School, consumer welfare, market share, Great Recession

JEL Classification: K2, K21

Suggested Citation

Sacher, Seth B. and Yun, John M., Some Reactions to “Reactionary Antitrust” (November 12, 2020). Published in Concurrences Competition Law Review, Nov. 2020, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 20-32, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3729460 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3729460

Seth B. Sacher

Independent ( email )

John M. Yun (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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