The Effectiveness of European Antitrust Fines

48 Pages Posted: 3 Dec 2020

See all articles by Cento Veljanovski

Cento Veljanovski

Case Associates; Institute of Economic Affairs

Date Written: November 13, 2020

Abstract

This paper examines the effectiveness of the administrative fines imposed by the European Commission on cartels from an economic perspective. It reviews the theory, practice, and evidence of optimal fines and assesses whether the European Commission fines, leniency, and settlement procedures deter and otherwise affect the actions of cartels.

Keywords: price-fixing, cartel, fines, recidivism, leniency, settlements, deterrence

JEL Classification: D4, K0, K21, L1, L4, L11, L12, L13, K14, L41, L44, N60

Suggested Citation

Veljanovski, Cento, The Effectiveness of European Antitrust Fines (November 13, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3730361 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3730361

Cento Veljanovski (Contact Author)

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