Preferences and Compliance with International Law

Theoretical Inquiries in Law (Forthcoming)

46 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2020

See all articles by Adam Chilton

Adam Chilton

University of Chicago - Law School

Katerina Linos

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ; University of California, Berkeley - Berkeley Center on Comparative Equality & Anti-Discrimination Law

Date Written: November 16, 2020

Abstract

International law lacks many of the standard features of domestic law. There are few legislative or judicial bodies with exclusive authority over particular jurisdictions or subject matters, the subjects regulated by international law typically must affirmatively consent to be bound by it, and supra-national authorities with the power to coerce states to comply with international obligations are rare. How can a legal system with these features generate changes in state behavior? For many theories, the ability of international law to inform and change individual preferences provides the answer. When voters care that treaty commitments be kept, or that international norms be honored, the theory goes, leaders are more likely to be able to make choices consistent with international obligations. Over the last decade, a literature has emerged testing these theories using surveys and experiments embedded in surveys. Multiple U.S. studies find that international law and international norm arguments shift public opinion in the direction of greater compliance by 4 to 20 percentage points. However, studies in foreign contexts are more mixed, with some backlash reported in countries in which international law is highly politicized. This article describes the state of current knowledge about whether international law actually does change preferences, explains limitations with existing research, and proposes avenues for future study.

Suggested Citation

Chilton, Adam and Linos, Katerina, Preferences and Compliance with International Law (November 16, 2020). Theoretical Inquiries in Law (Forthcoming), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3731868

Adam Chilton

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.adamchilton.org

Katerina Linos (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

488 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States

University of California, Berkeley - Berkeley Center on Comparative Equality & Anti-Discrimination Law

Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States

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