Exposing the Revolving Door in Executive Branch Agencies
57 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2021 Last revised: 13 Feb 2024
Date Written: February 22, 2022
We develop an extensive mapping of the revolving door phenomenon by examining the work experience of 420,153 individuals in top corporate positions at 12,869 firms. More than half of these firms have at least one such individual with prior experience in one of 187 executive branch agencies. We find that firms are more likely to receive procurement contracts following the appointment of a former regulator transitioning within two years of leaving the agency. This result is consistent with the “knowledge” hypothesis. Furthermore, less-complex contracts signed following the appointment of former regulators are more likely to be renegotiated, resulting in higher costs for the government.
Keywords: Revolving door, government, procurement contracts, regulation
JEL Classification: D72; K23; G38; L51; J45
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