Exposing the Revolving Door in Executive Branch Agencies

57 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2021 Last revised: 13 Feb 2024

See all articles by Logan P. Emery

Logan P. Emery

Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University

Mara Faccio

Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr. School of Business, Purdue University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: February 22, 2022

Abstract

We develop an extensive mapping of the revolving door phenomenon by examining the work experience of 420,153 individuals in top corporate positions at 12,869 firms. More than half of these firms have at least one such individual with prior experience in one of 187 executive branch agencies. We find that firms are more likely to receive procurement contracts following the appointment of a former regulator transitioning within two years of leaving the agency. This result is consistent with the “knowledge” hypothesis. Furthermore, less-complex contracts signed following the appointment of former regulators are more likely to be renegotiated, resulting in higher costs for the government.

Keywords: Revolving door, government, procurement contracts, regulation

JEL Classification: D72; K23; G38; L51; J45

Suggested Citation

Emery, Logan and Faccio, Mara, Exposing the Revolving Door in Executive Branch Agencies (February 22, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3732484 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3732484

Logan Emery

Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University ( email )

RSM Erasmus University
PO Box 1738
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Mara Faccio (Contact Author)

Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr. School of Business, Purdue University ( email )

403 W. State Street
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

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