Download This PaperPecunia Non Olet: on the Self-Selection into (Dis)honest Earning Opportunities
54 Pages Posted: 23 Nov 2020 Last revised: 1 Jul 2021
Date Written: November 19, 2020
Abstract
We study self-selection into earning money in an honest or dishonest fashion based on individuals' attitudes toward truthful reporting. We propose a decision-theoretic framework where individuals' willingness to pay for honest earnings is determined by their (behavioral) lying costs. Our laboratory experiment identifies lying costs as the decisive factor causing self-selection into honest earning opportunities for individuals with high costs and into cheating opportunities for those prepared to misreport. Our experimental setup allows us to recover individual lying costs and their distribution in the population.
Keywords: lying behavior, lying costs, misreporting, honest earnings, self-selection, laboratory experiment
JEL Classification: C91, D81, D91, K42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )
Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany
IZA Institute of Labor Economics
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/public_economics/research_affiliates/tim_lohse.cfm