Vertical Mergers and Integration in Digital Markets

19 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2020

See all articles by John M. Yun

John M. Yun

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: November 11, 2020

Abstract

In this chapter, we address three issues relating to vertical mergers and antitrust: (1) incorporating the elimination of double marginalization into the analysis of the likelihood of a unilateral price effect rather than treating it as a separate efficiencies defense; (2) recognizing, inter alia, the importance of reduced transaction costs in analyzing the efficiencies commonly associated with vertical mergers; and (3) highlighting that the weight of the empirical evidence continues to support the proposition that vertical mergers are less likely to generate competitive concerns than horizontal mergers.

Suggested Citation

Yun, John M., Vertical Mergers and Integration in Digital Markets (November 11, 2020). The Global Antitrust Institute Report on the Digital Economy 8, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3733684 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3733684

John M. Yun (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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