Potential Competition, Nascent Competitors, and Killer Acquisitions

27 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2020

See all articles by John M. Yun

John M. Yun

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: November 11, 2020

Abstract

In this chapter, we address a number of critical questions. Is there a problem with large technology firms, or platforms, purchasing nascent competitors and suppressing competition before they can mature into vibrant competitors? Further, if there is a problem, are the current antitrust laws and the enforcement of those laws sufficient to combat the problem? If not, is there a legislative solution? In addressing these questions, we offer a clear delineation and classification scheme to differentiate potential competition, nascent competitors, and killer acquisitions. Ultimately, while classification schemes are helpful, the assessment of all horizontal acquisitions, whether the rivalry is currently happening or will happen in the future, comes down to the core analytical considerations involving competitive effects, entry, and efficiencies.

Suggested Citation

Yun, John M., Potential Competition, Nascent Competitors, and Killer Acquisitions (November 11, 2020). The Global Antitrust Institute Report on the Digital Economy 18, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3733716 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3733716

John M. Yun (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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