Evaluating the Case for Regulation of Digital Platforms

59 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2020

See all articles by Giuseppe Colangelo

Giuseppe Colangelo

University of Basilicata, Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Economics; Stanford Law School; LUISS Guido Carli, Department of Business and Management

Date Written: November 11, 2020

Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to analyze recently released reports and policy papers to evaluate whether regulatory interventions reflect the distinctive features of digital markets and their leading players or whether the main thrust of these proposals for regulatory interventions is just to circumvent the burdens imposed by standard antitrust analysis. My findings suggest that the revival of regulation is likely motivated by an alleged antitrust enforcement failure as a result of an alleged gap in the current antitrust rules, rather than by an authentic market failure.

Suggested Citation

Colangelo, Giuseppe, Evaluating the Case for Regulation of Digital Platforms (November 11, 2020). The Global Antitrust Institute Report on the Digital Economy 26, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3733741 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3733741

Giuseppe Colangelo (Contact Author)

University of Basilicata, Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Economics ( email )

Via dell'Ateneo Lucano 10
Potenza
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/giuseppecolangelouni/home

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

HOME PAGE: http://law.stanford.edu/transatlantic-technology-law-forum/

LUISS Guido Carli, Department of Business and Management ( email )

Viale Romania 32
Rome, Roma 00197
Italy

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