Download This PaperAntitrust Exemptions and Immunities in the Digital Economy
40 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2020
Date Written: November 11, 2020
Abstract
Exemptions and immunities limit the reach of the antitrust laws. If the courts and agencies implement exemptions and immunities too expansively, anticompetitive conduct will elude enforcement and thereby injure consumers. The dynamic nature of the digital economy amplifies these concerns. Policymakers, courts, and regulators must diligently assess the ever-changing digital landscape and tailor antitrust doctrine accordingly.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Kobayashi, Bruce H. and Wright, Joshua D., Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities in the Digital Economy (November 11, 2020). The Global Antitrust Institute Report on the Digital Economy 30, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3733747 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3733747
Bruce H. Kobayashi (Contact Author)
George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-8034 (Phone)
703-993-8088 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~bkobayas
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