Institutional Reforms and Agency Design

27 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2020 Last revised: 29 Jul 2021

See all articles by Daniel A. Crane

Daniel A. Crane

University of Michigan Law School

Date Written: November 11, 2020

Abstract

Despite the idiosyncratic and sometimes counterproductive institutional scheme of federal antitrust enforcement created by failed Congressional design and decades of iterative experimentation, the U.S. antitrust agencies function relatively successfully most of the time. Because of this, the temptation is always to let well enough alone. There are many more pressing needs than major overhauls of the federal antitrust agencies. That said, if there is political will for reforms, there are no shortage of sensible possibilities.

Suggested Citation

Crane, Daniel A., Institutional Reforms and Agency Design (November 11, 2020). The Global Antitrust Institute Report on the Digital Economy 33, U of Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 20-044, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3733753 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3733753

Daniel A. Crane (Contact Author)

University of Michigan Law School ( email )

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United States
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