Optimal Contracts with Privately Informed Agents and Active Principals

34 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2003

See all articles by Diego Garcia

Diego Garcia

University of Colorado at Boulder - Leeds School of Business; University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Finance Area

Date Written: September 10, 2003

Abstract

This paper considers an optimal contracting problem between an informed risk-averse agent and a principal, when the agent needs to perform multiple tasks, and the principal is active, i.e. she can influence some aspect of the agency relationship. It discusses the optimality of action restrictions in the equilibrium menus of linear contracts showing that private information considerations add new trade-offs to the optimal contracts in the multitask setting. The paper also has novel implications for the capital budgeting literature that studies informational problems. In particular the nature of the private information, e.g. whether it affects the marginal value of investment, the value of the agent's effort choice, or potential interactions between effort and investment, plays a crucial role in the optimal contracts. It is shown that several standard features of the optimal contracts are altered once the principal can affect the agency relationship through its capital budget, as well as through the compensation package.

Keywords: mechanism design, multi-task agency, action restrictions, active principal, capital budgeting

JEL Classification: C70, D82, G31

Suggested Citation

Garcia, Diego, Optimal Contracts with Privately Informed Agents and Active Principals (September 10, 2003). Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 03-01; AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=373542 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.373542

Diego Garcia (Contact Author)

University of Colorado at Boulder - Leeds School of Business ( email )

Boulder, CO 80309-0419
United States

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Finance Area

Kenan-Flagler Business School
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
344
Abstract Views
2,282
rank
93,372
PlumX Metrics