Marketing with Shallow and Prudent Influencers

33 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2020 Last revised: 26 Feb 2021

See all articles by Ron Berman

Ron Berman

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Xudong Zheng

Johns Hopkins University, Zanvyl Krieger School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics, Students

Date Written: September 1, 2020

Abstract

Marketers often utilize social media influencers to reach audiences with more authentic and credible messaging. While some influencers are prudent and carefully test products before promoting them, many others are shallow and merely post the marketer messaging as is. We analyze the impact of shallow and prudent influencers on marketer profits, customer satisfaction, and influencer payoffs. Counter to intuition, we find that shallow influencers increase market transparency, consumer satisfaction and marketer profits, while prudent influencers entice the marketers to reduce information efficiency in the market, and increase the share of unsatisfied consumers. In a market where both shallow and prudent influencers exist, prudent influencers may increase their payoff even further by extracting additional information rent. The results provide insight into the value that shallow influencers bring to the market and guidance for marketers considering the use of influencer marketing.

Keywords: Influencer Marketing, Product Reviews, Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion

JEL Classification: D82, D83, M31

Suggested Citation

Berman, Ron and Zheng, Xudong, Marketing with Shallow and Prudent Influencers (September 1, 2020). NET Institute Working Paper No. 20-06, The Wharton School Research Paper Forthcoming, NYU Stern School of Business Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3735478 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3735478

Ron Berman (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Xudong Zheng

Johns Hopkins University, Zanvyl Krieger School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics, Students ( email )

3400 Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218-2685
United States

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