Asymmetric Information, Strategic Transfers, and the Design of Long-Term Care Policies

43 Pages Posted: 2 Dec 2020

See all articles by Chiara Canta

Chiara Canta

Toulouse Business School

Helmuth Cremer

University of Toulouse (GREMAQ & IDEI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2020

Abstract

Our theoretical analysis is completed by numerical solutions based on a calibrated example. In the uniform case, public care should represent up to 40% of total care but its share decreases to about 30% as the weight of children increases. In the nonlinear case, public care increases with the children's cost of providing care at a faster rate when children's weight in social welfare is higher. It represents 100% of total care for the families with high-cost children.

JEL Classification: H2, H5

Suggested Citation

Canta, Chiara and Cremer, Helmuth, Asymmetric Information, Strategic Transfers, and the Design of Long-Term Care Policies (November 2020). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15421, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3737554

Chiara Canta (Contact Author)

Toulouse Business School ( email )

20, bd Lascrosses
Toulouse, 31068
France

Helmuth Cremer

University of Toulouse (GREMAQ & IDEI) ( email )

Toulouse, 31000
France
+33 1 6112 8606 (Phone)
+33 1 6112 8637 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
0
Abstract Views
71
PlumX Metrics