State Versus Federal Wiretap Orders: A Look at the Data

28 Pages Posted: 12 Jan 2021

See all articles by Jason Chan

Jason Chan

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management

Jin-Hyuk Kim

University of Colorado at Boulder

Liad Wagman

Illinois Institute of Technology - Stuart School of Business, IIT

Date Written: November 26, 2020

Abstract

Title III, codified at Title 18 USC \S\S 2510-2521, allows for federal and state law enforcement interceptions of wire, oral, or electronic communications, which requires obtaining a court order. For the two parallel court systems in the United States, however, the operational standard being followed by law enforcement agencies may differ. This paper compares the outcomes from wiretap orders authorized by the federal and the state courts. Guided by an economic model of criminal behavior, we show that arrests and convictions increase in wiretap intensity (at a diminishing rate), but federal orders reach the peak point faster than state orders so. We do not find cross effects between the two layers of wiretap orders.

Keywords: Drug crime; federalism; surveillance

JEL Classification: K14, K42

Suggested Citation

Chan, Jason and Kim, Jin-Hyuk and Wagman, Liad, State Versus Federal Wiretap Orders: A Look at the Data (November 26, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3737978 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3737978

Jason Chan

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management ( email )

19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

HOME PAGE: http://carlsonschool.umn.edu/faculty/jason-chan

Jin-Hyuk Kim (Contact Author)

University of Colorado at Boulder ( email )

Campus Box 256
Boulder, CO 80309
United States

Liad Wagman

Illinois Institute of Technology - Stuart School of Business, IIT ( email )

565 W Adams St Suite 412
Chicago, IL 60661
United States
7739809883 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://lwagman.org

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