The New Competition Tool: An Analysis of the Policy Options and Institutional Set-Up

18 Pages Posted: 30 Nov 2020 Last revised: 2 Dec 2020

See all articles by Christophe Carugati

Christophe Carugati

Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas

Date Written: November 26, 2020

Abstract

The European Commission (hereinafter “the Commission”) is seeking views on how to adapt is EU competition law to the digital economy. Against this background, on June 2, 2020, the Commission published two public consultations on a potential New Competition Tool (NCT) and a potential ex-ante asymmetric regulation against large online platforms (DSA). The NCT is a market investigation instrument to deal with structural competition problems. The DSA is a regulation that governs the behavior of large online platforms with a list of interdictions and obligations. Both tools will be merged into a single legislative framework, the Digital Markets Act (DMA). The legislative proposal is expected to be published on December 9, 2020. However, it is already possible to get insights on the NCT as the Commission has released the outcome of the public consultation (but not yet about the DSA). Is a New Competition Tool necessary? And if yes, how? This paper answers these questions by analyzing the data concerning the policy options (section I) and institutional set-up (section II).

Keywords: Digital Competition; Competition Economics; Competition Law; New Competition Tool (NCT); Digital Economy; European Commission; Market Investigation; Regulation

JEL Classification: K21; L5; L86

Suggested Citation

Carugati, Christophe, The New Competition Tool: An Analysis of the Policy Options and Institutional Set-Up (November 26, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3737996 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3737996

Christophe Carugati (Contact Author)

Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas ( email )

12 place du Pantheon
Paris cedex 06, 75231
France

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.digital-competition.com/

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