Shareholder Lawsuits and CEO Turnover Decisions

We study the effect of shareholder litigation rights on CEO turnover policies using U.S. states’ staggered adoption of Universal Demand laws, which restrict shareholder lawsuits that allege a breach of fiduciary duty by directors or managers. We document that reduced shareholder litigation rights are associated with greater CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, and that this effect is more prominent in firms with existing blockholders and higher ex-ante litigation risk. The empirical evidence suggests a substitute relationship between active monitoring through CEO turnover policies and disciplinary shareholder litigation. Our study contributes to the debate on the role of shareholder litigation in corporate governance.

Keywords: CEO Turnover, Shareholder Litigation

JEL Classification: G34, K22, M41, M51

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Hayes, Rachel M. and Peng, Xiaoxia and Wang, Xue, Shareholder Lawsuits and CEO Turnover Decisions (November 29, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3739246 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3739246