Antitrust Remedies In Digital Markets: Lessons For Enforcement Authorities From Non-Compliance With EU Google Decisions

Hausfeld Competition Bulletin Fall 2020

12 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2021 Last revised: 3 May 2021

See all articles by Thomas Hoppner

Thomas Hoppner

Technical University Wildau; Hausfeld RA LLP

Date Written: November 17, 2020

Abstract

A recently published study by the author addressed the remedies imposed in the European Commission’s (the “Commission”) Google Search (Shopping) antitrust decision of 2017. The study ‘Google’s (Non-) Compliance with the EU Shopping Decision,’ considered the measures that Google implemented in Europe to comply with the Shopping decision as meritless. This article summarizes the views expressed in the study, and includes some recommendations for future antitrust enforcement in digital markets with strong information asymmetries and fast-moving targets.

Keywords: antitrust, competition, Google, comparison shopping, platforms, self-preferencing, favouring, remedies, non-compliance

Suggested Citation

Höppner, Thomas, Antitrust Remedies In Digital Markets: Lessons For Enforcement Authorities From Non-Compliance With EU Google Decisions (November 17, 2020). Hausfeld Competition Bulletin Fall 2020 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3739813 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3739813

Thomas Höppner (Contact Author)

Technical University Wildau ( email )

Hochschulring 1
Wildau, 15745
Germany

Hausfeld RA LLP ( email )

Kurfürstendamm 218
Berlin, 10719
Germany

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