Organised Labour, Labour Market Imperfections, and Employer Wage Premia

67 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2020

See all articles by Sabien Dobbelaere

Sabien Dobbelaere

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Boris Hirsch

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg

Steffen Müller

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg-Friedrich Alexander Universität Erlangen Nürnberg; Halle Institute for Economic Research

Georg Neuschäffer

Halle Institute for Economic Research

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Abstract

This paper examines how collective bargaining through unions and workplace codetermination through works councils shape labour market imperfections and how labour market imperfections matter for employer wage premia. Based on representative German plant data for the years 1999-2016, we document that labour market imperfections are the norm rather than the exception. Wage mark-downs, that is wages below the marginal revenue product of labour rooted in employers' monopsony power, are the most prevalent outcome. We further find that both types of organised labour are accompanied by a smaller prevalence and intensity of wage mark-downs whereas the opposite holds for wage mark-ups, that is wages above the marginal revenue product of labour rooted in workers' monopoly power. Finally, we document a close link between our production-based labour market imperfection measures and employer wage premia. The prevalence and intensity of wage mark-downs are associated with a smaller level and larger dispersion of premia whereas wage mark-ups are only accompanied by a higher premium level.

JEL Classification: J42, J50, J31, D22

Suggested Citation

Dobbelaere, Sabien and Hirsch, Boris and Mueller, Steffen and Neuschäffer, Georg, Organised Labour, Labour Market Imperfections, and Employer Wage Premia. IZA Discussion Paper No. 13909, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3743133 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3743133

Sabien Dobbelaere (Contact Author)

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam - Department of Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
NL- Amsterdam, NL-1081 HV
Netherlands
0031 20 598 28 74 (Phone)

Tinbergen Institute

Keizersgracht 482
NL- Amsterdam, NL-1017 EG
Netherlands

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
D- Bonn, 53072
Germany

Boris Hirsch

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg ( email )

Schloßplatz 4
Erlangen, DE Bavaria 91054
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.arbeitsmarkt.wiso.uni-erlangen.de/english/hirsch_e.htm

Steffen Mueller

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg-Friedrich Alexander Universität Erlangen Nürnberg ( email )

Schloßplatz 4
Erlangen, DE Bavaria 91054
Germany

Halle Institute for Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 11 03 61
Kleine Maerkerstrasse 8
D-06017 Halle, 06108
Germany

Georg Neuschäffer

Halle Institute for Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 11 03 61
Kleine Maerkerstrasse 8
D-06017 Halle, 06108
Germany

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