Open Government Data for Digital Services: Effects on Innovation, Competition and Societal Benefits

50 Pages Posted: 7 Dec 2020

Date Written: December 6, 2020

Abstract

Prompted by recent open data policies in the European Union and the United States, administrations increasingly publish their public sector information. Opening government data for broad commercial re-use is thereby motivated by three primary policy goals: innovation, competition and societal benefits. However, so far, a comprehensive evaluation of how open government data affects re-users' incentives and ensuing market outcomes in the digital economy is missing. Therefore, we conduct a conceptual analysis of the economic effects of open government data and characterize conditions under which primary policy goals can be achieved. Our findings highlight a basic trade-off between innovation and competition goals and demonstrate that the effectiveness of open government data crucially depends on the information contained in a data set. By distinguishing different information domains, we derive insights for policy makers on which open government data sets can promote a desired policy goal and how to balance economic trade-offs.

Keywords: open data, open government data, public sector information, open access, data-driven business models, innovation, competition in digital markets, privacy, economic regulation, policy making

JEL Classification: L17,L38,L86

Suggested Citation

Haberer, Bastian and Schnurr, Daniel, Open Government Data for Digital Services: Effects on Innovation, Competition and Societal Benefits (December 6, 2020). TPRC48: The 48th Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3743648 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3743648

Bastian Haberer (Contact Author)

University of Passau ( email )

Dr.-Hans-Kapfinger-Str. 12
Passau, 94032
Germany

Daniel Schnurr

University of Passau ( email )

Dr.-Hans-Kapfinger-Str. 12
Passau, 94032
Germany

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