Use and Abuse of Antidumping by Global Cartels

47 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2020

See all articles by Arevik Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan

Arevik Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan

European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO); Leibniz Universität Hannover - Faculty of Economics and Management

Martin Hoffstadt

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universität Hannover

Date Written: 2020

Abstract

Antidumping creates opportunities for abuse to stifle market competition. Whether cartels actually abuse trade policy for anticompetitive purposes remains an open question in the literature. To address this gap, we construct a novel dataset that matches cartel investigations with trade data at the product level. We then estimate the world import price and quantity effects of antidumping in cartel products. We find that the use of antidumping in cartel industries helps to maintain higher world import prices and lower quantities during cartel periods, and to induce the establishment of a cartel. The effect is present both for antidumping cases that result in duties and cases that are withdrawn by the petitioning industry.

JEL Classification: F130, F140, L410

Suggested Citation

Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, Arevik and Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, Arevik and Hoffstadt, Martin, Use and Abuse of Antidumping by Global Cartels (2020). CESifo Working Paper No. 8729, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3744592 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3744592

Arevik Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan (Contact Author)

European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO) ( email )

Villa San Paolo
Via della Piazzuola 43
50133 Florence
Italy

Leibniz Universität Hannover - Faculty of Economics and Management ( email )

Koenigsworther Platz 1
Hannover, 30167
Germany

Martin Hoffstadt

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universität Hannover ( email )

Welfengarten 1
Hannover, DE 30167
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
47
Abstract Views
227
PlumX Metrics