Voting Behavior in One-Shot and Iterative Multiple Referenda

36 Pages Posted: 1 Feb 2021

See all articles by Umberto Grandi

Umberto Grandi

University of Toulouse 1 - Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse (IRIT)

Jerome Lang

Université Paris Dauphine

Ali Ozkes

WU Vienna Institute for Markets and Strategy

Stéphane Airiau

Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University

Date Written: December 12, 2020

Abstract

We consider a set of voters making a collective decision via simultaneous vote on two binary issues. Voters' preferences are captured by payoffs assigned to combinations of outcomes for each issue and they can be nonseparable: a voter's preference over an issue might be dependent on the other issue. When the collective decision in this context is reached by voting on both issues at the same time, multiple election paradoxes may arise, as studied extensively in the theoretical literature. In this paper we pursue an experimental approach and investigate the impact of iterative voting, in which groups deliberate by repeating the voting process until a final outcome is reached. Our results from experiments run in the lab show that voters tend to have an optimistic rather than a pessimistic behaviour when casting a vote on a non-separable issue and that iterated voting may in fact improve the social outcome. We provide the first comprehensive empirical analysis of individual and collective behavior in the multiple referendum setting.

Keywords: Behavioural social choice, Deliberation, Iterative voting, Multiple referenda, Voting on combinatorial domains

JEL Classification: C91, C92, D71, D72, D92

Suggested Citation

Grandi, Umberto and Lang, Jerome and Ozkes, Ali and Airiau, Stéphane, Voting Behavior in One-Shot and Iterative Multiple Referenda (December 12, 2020). Université Paris-Dauphine Research Paper No. 3747713, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3747713 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3747713

Umberto Grandi

University of Toulouse 1 - Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse (IRIT) ( email )

Toulouse
France

Jerome Lang

Université Paris Dauphine

223 Rue Saint-Honore
Paris, 75775
France

Ali Ozkes (Contact Author)

WU Vienna Institute for Markets and Strategy ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1
Vienna, 1020
Austria

Stéphane Airiau

Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny
Paris, 75016
France

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