Protecting Chinese Investors Through Oppression Actions: An Examination in Light of the Position in the United Kingdom

18 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2020

See all articles by Andrew R. Keay

Andrew R. Keay

University of Leeds - School of Law

Joan Loughrey

School of Law, Queens University Belfast

Chuyi Wei

Peking University - Peking University Law School; University of Leeds, Faculty of Education, Social Sciences and Law, School of Education, Students; Nottingham Law School

Jingchen Zhao

Nottingham Law School

Ting Hu

Wuhan University - School of Economics and Management

Date Written: December 15, 2020

Abstract

Minority shareholders in large companies, particularly where there is a majority/controlling shareholder, can be in a vulnerable position as they are not likely to be able to have much influence in the company or how its affairs are conducted. The position in which minority shareholders find themselves has caused many governments to provide protection in some form or another for minority shareholders. There are various corporate law or corporate governance mechanisms that have been embraced, one being a provision that allows shareholders to seek relief from the courts where oppression exists. China does not have a dedicated provision that gives minority shareholders such an action. This paper examines what China’s company law does offer shareholders by way of protection through direct action and focuses on whether the UK’s oppression provision, which has existed since 1948, (or elements of it) could be used in the Chinese context. An important contribution of the paper is that it identifies Chinese cases decided since 2012 in which shareholders have brought claims in situations where oppression was, effectively, alleged.

Suggested Citation

Keay, Andrew R. and Loughrey, Joan and Wei, Chuyi and Zhao, Jingchen and hu, ting, Protecting Chinese Investors Through Oppression Actions: An Examination in Light of the Position in the United Kingdom (December 15, 2020). Australian Journal of Asian Law, 2020, Vol 21 No 1, Article 05: 77-93, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3748927

Andrew R. Keay (Contact Author)

University of Leeds - School of Law ( email )

Corporate and Commercial Law
Leeds LS2 9JT
United Kingdom
0113-343-6389 (Phone)

Joan Loughrey

School of Law, Queens University Belfast ( email )

University Road
Belfast, BT71NN
United Kingdom

Chuyi Wei

Peking University - Peking University Law School ( email )

5 Yiheyuan Road
Haidian District
Beijing, Beijing 100871
China

University of Leeds, Faculty of Education, Social Sciences and Law, School of Education, Students ( email )

United Kingdom

Nottingham Law School ( email )

United Kingdom

Jingchen Zhao

Nottingham Law School ( email )

Belgrave Centre
Chauser Street
Nottingham, NG1 5LP
United Kingdom

Ting Hu

Wuhan University - School of Economics and Management ( email )

Wu Han, Hu-Bai 430072
China

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