Using Experimental Data to Model Bargaining Behavior in Ultimatum Games

Posted: 13 Feb 2003

See all articles by Shyam Sunder

Shyam Sunder

Yale University - School of Management; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Haijin Lin

University of Houston

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

Subgame perfect equilibrium predictions of ultimatum bargaining games correspond poorly to the data gathered from human subjects in laboratory environments. Attempts to reconcile this discrepancy have taken one or more of three routes: (1) expanding the agent foresight and scope of decisions, (2) explicit modeling of agents' initial beliefs and their dynamics, and (3) adding social arguments to agent preferences. We take the first two routes by including the probability of rejection by the responder in proposer's decision, and using experimental data to estimate a static model of agent beliefs. Data from previously reported experiments is compared to the predictions of the optimal decision rule to validate the proposer model. Models in which the probability of acceptance of a proposal declines with the amount offered to the responder are better able to organize the data about the behavior of both players. Explanation of responders' behavior remains weak.

Keywords: Ultimatum Game, Experimental Economics, Parametric Modeling, Estimation

JEL Classification: C72, C78, C92

Suggested Citation

Sunder, Shyam and Lin, Haijin, Using Experimental Data to Model Bargaining Behavior in Ultimatum Games. EXPERIMENTAL BUSINESS RESEARCH, Chapter 16, pp. 373-97, Kluwer Academic Publishers, December 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=374900

Shyam Sunder (Contact Author)

Yale University - School of Management ( email )

165 Whitney Avenue
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
203-432-6160 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/sunder/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Haijin Lin

University of Houston ( email )

390F Melcher Hall
Bauer College of Business
Houston, TX 77204-6021
United States
7137437771 (Phone)

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