La responsabilidad de los administradores frente a los accionistas de diferente clase con intereses contrapuestos ( The Managers’ Duty of Giving Equal Treatment to Shareholders in Business Associations with Several Kinds of Shares. Can Managers Serve Two Masters with Conflicting Interests without Breaching Fiduciary Duties?)

Abstract

Spanish Abstract: En contraste con la pregunta sobre si se debe maximizar el patrimonio social o tratar igualitariamente a accionistas y otros grupos de interés, el interrogante sobre la responsabilidad de los administradores en sociedades con diferentes clases de acciones ha sido objeto de poca atención en Colombia. ¿Puede preferirse a algunos accionistas o debe tratarse a todos ellos equitativamente? Este artículo concluye que se debe preferir a los accionistas ordinarios cuando una decisión implique un conflicto entre estos y accionistas preferenciales. Empero, en relación con acciones de voto múltiple, de seguimiento o de pago debe tratarse equitativamente a todos los
accionistas.

English Abstract: While whether managers and directors shall maximize equity or give equal treatment to shareholders and stakeholders is a well-studied question, the analysis of liability where two or more kinds of shares have been issued is almost inexistent in Colombia. May managers and directors prefer some shareholders or shall they give equal treatment to all? This paper concludes that they shall prefer common shareholders regarding decisions entailing conflicts of interests between the former and preferred shareholders. In contrast, and as to dual-class shares, trac-king shares and stock received as payment for services, managers and directors shall treat equally all shareholders.

Note: Downloadable document is in Spanish.

Keywords: corporations; law & economics; liability; managers